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EXPANDING THE EVIDENTIARY FRAME
FOR COOPERATING WITNESSES
Daniel Richman*

One telling feature of this conference as a whole has been the
extent to which speakers have focused on the cooperation dynamic
outside the courtroom. Prosecutors should take more pains to
avoid suborning or even unconsciously encouraging perjury by the
cooperator who is looking for a lower sentence. Courts and
disciplinary authorities should ensure that such pains are taken. 1
What's interesting is how little attention has been given to
changing what happens in front of the jury. Since our assignment
has been to think "outside of the box" (which usually means
proposing something interesting but really wrong or dangerous),
I'd like to broach the question of whether we should do more to
align the zealous prosecutor's interest in winning with an
institutional interest in justice, by expanding the range of proof
that a jury ordinarily considers when it comes to cooperation.
Trials of course are a rarity in our system. 2 But interactions
with prospective witnesses do take place in the shadow of
evidentiary rules. 3 In our effort to structure the interaction
between prosecutors and cooperators, it is worth considering the
incentives, or more precisely the lack of incentives, that prevailing
evidentiary rules give to prosecutors.
Consider the skilled and ethical prosecutor.
When a
defendant comes in saying he wants to cooperate, the prosecutor
does not tell the defendant what she's looking for. Nor does she
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Assistant U.S. Attorney,
Southern District of New York, 1987-92.
1 See Bennett L. Gershman, Witness Coaching by Prosecutors, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.
829 (2002); Michael S. Ross, Thinking Outside the Box: How the Enforcement of Ethical
Rules Can Minimize the Dangers of Prosecutorial Leniency and Immunity Deals, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 875 (2002).
2 See UTILIZATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS PROJECT, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1999, at 418 tbl. 5.20, 454 tbl. 5.51 (Ann L. Pastore &
Kathleen Maguire eds., 1999), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook (last visited
Sept. 5, 2001).
3 See Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial
Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 975-79 (1997).
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sit passively when the defendant's first tale minimizes not just his
own culpability but that of his friends. She won't throw him out of
the room-after all, if she didn't think she needed his testimony,
she wouldn't have met with him in the first place. She'll confront
him, trying to walk the fine line between showing the defendant
that she can tell when he's lying (good) and giving the defendant a
road map of what he needs to say to make the government happy
(bad). This truly is a fine line, since the perceptions of prosecutor
and defendant may differ greatly.
The delicate dance will have to continue until trial, and will
include agents as well as prosecutors. The signals that all of these
government actors convey, sometimes subtly sometimes not, will
incorporate allusions to other sources of information (which may
or may not be admissible at trial), references to the consequences
of perjury, and indications about the government's readiness to
pursue such sanctions in the event the defendant lies. These
signals can be misused, but in this particular case, the prosecutors
and agents act carefully and responsibly, adhering closely to Judge
Trott's precepts. 4
Then comes trial. What does the standard cooperator trial
look like? It usually has the prosecutor pointing to all the
corroboration of the cooperator's testimony (which, as noted,
probably is incomplete) 5 and then arguing why the cooperator,
although maybe a bad person, has no motive to lie here, or at least
has a stronger motive, given the potential sanctions, to be truthful.
Barred from "vouching,"6 the prosecutor will take pains to avoid
putting the government's imprimatur on the testimony. The
defendant will respond by focusing on the cooperator's motive to
stretch the truth and curry favor with the government. If the
4 See Hon. Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as
Witnesses, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1381 (1996).
5 See Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Defendants: The Costs and Benefits of
Purchasing Information from Scoundrels, 8 FED. SENTENCING RPTR. 292 (1996). There
may be a tendency, however, for prosecutors to "overbuy" cooperator testimony. See id.
at 293.
6 See United States v. Dispoz-0-Plastics, Inc., 172 F.3d 275, 283 (3d Cir. 1999)
("Vouching constitutes an assurance by the prosecuting attorney of the credibility of a
Government witness through personal knowledge or by other information outside of the
testimony before the jury.") (quoting United States v. Walker, 155 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir.
1998)); United States v. Francis, 170 F.3d 546, 550 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that a
prosecutor's implication that he "is in a special position to ascertain whether the witness
was, in fact, testifying truthfully ... leads quickly to improper vouching"); United States v.
Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 414 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that a prosecutor "may not personally
vouch for the credibility of a government witness, as doing so may imply that [she] ... has
additional personal knowledge about the witness and facts that confirm the witness'
testimony, or may add credence to such testimony") (quoting United States v.
Washington, 44 F.3d 1271, 1278 (5th Cir. 1995)).
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government has disclosed the cooperator's initial lies to the
prosecutor,7 the jury will probably hear about them, and about the
great deal the cooperator received. Perhaps defense counsel will
try to highlight the mechanics of the government's witness
preparation, but this is difficult to do, and efforts in that direction
are generally desultory.
In some exceptional cases, the
impeachment effort will go beyond this, but it generally does not.
If one steps back from this spectacle, it's pretty odd. There is
frequently little question that the prosecutor's integrity is on the
line (implicitly, and sometimes explicitly). Alternatively, if the
defendant uses the "honorable man" approach8 and characterizes
the prosecutor as the dupe of the conniving cooperator, the
prosecutor's acumen is in issue. Yet these are the last things that
the honest prosecutor will talk about. All the pains she took in the
delicate dance with the cooperator are not for naught. But the
jury generally won't hear much about them, however relevant they
might be for assessing the cooperator's credibility.
Why is this? Given the diversity of viewpoints represented at
this conference, I am sure some would explain the common
scenario by suggesting that prosecutors generally mishandle their
cooperators and that they don't want defense counsel or juries to
find that out. However, while empirical certainties are impossible
here, I don't think this is the case, and believe that explanations
must be sought elsewhere. One factor may be the interaction of
procedural rules and institutional choices. To the extent that the
prosecutor trying a case has played a role in debriefing and
preparing a cooperator for trial, the rule against unsworn
testimony will largely preclude her from exploring that process in
front of the jury through other witnesses. 9 Even were a side-lined
prosecutor actually to take the stand, inquiry into her dealings with
the cooperator would likely be hampered by the inadmissibility of
information that, . although not directly conveyed to the
7 See United States v. Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (granting defense
motion to compel government's pretrial disclosure of documents relating to process
leading up to accomplice witness's cooperation agreement).
8 See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 3, SC. 2.
9 See, e.g., United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 933 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that an
attorney may not "subtly impart to the jury his first-hand knowledge of the events without
having to swear an oath or be subject to cross-examination"). Courts do tolerate
references to the fact that a prosecutor played a role in some out of court drama, so long
as this does not become a major issue in the case. See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 75
F.3d 1097, 1106 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that disqualification was not required where the
Assistant U.S. Attorney made two references in front of trial jury to his presence during
interviews between the cooperating witness and the FBI); United States v. Bin Laden, 126
F. Supp. 2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (denying motion to disqualify an Assistant U.S. Attorney
who had participated in early interviews with the defendant).
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cooperator, played a part in the government's testing process.
Such inquiry would also have to avoid references to the
prosecutor's experience in such matters, lest they be considered
improper "vouching." Moreover, the practice of calling the
prosecutor most familiar with the case as a trial witness would
prevent a prosecutorial office from reaping the considerable
benefits of a vertical system in which the same prosecutor works a
case from beginning to end.
Rules and institutional choices are probably not the only
reasons for prosecutors' failure to explore the cooperation
dynamic in front of the jury. Another part of the problem might
be the limitations of narrative in this area. Even if she could put
herself on the stand, how exactly would our skilled, ethical
prosecutor actually convey to a lay jury the pains she has taken
with a cooperator? What struck me about Ellen Yaroshefsky's
insightful article on prosecutors and cooperators was how illequipped the prosecutors who thought justice was being done were
to explain how they knew what they knew. The risks of using
cooperator testimony are so great as to be self-evident to all but
the most unreflective (and inept) prosecutor, and most of the
prosecutors or ex-prosecutors whom Professor Yaroshevsky
quoted were candid about them. Nonetheless, seventy-five
percent of the people she interviewed "expressed the belief that
they obtained most of the truth and 'could get to the bottom of
things."' 10 The point is not that these prosecutors' confidence was
necessarily well-founded. Rather, it offers yet another reason why
our hypothetical prosecutor will be hamstrung in conveying at trial
how she handled her witness.
These various explanations are well and good, some a
function of sensible evidentiary protections, some of rational
prosecutorial choices. But we should at least consider the costs of
not exploring the details of each cooperation dynamic in front of
the jury.
Judge Trott's precepts about handling cooperators aren't just
pieces of professional advice. They are also sensible rules for
getting the truth out of cooperators, or at least enabling the proper
evaluation of cooperator testimony. A great many jurors would
understand and appreciate them. If they could, these jurors would
reward the prosecutor who abided by them, and disadvantage the
prosecutors who didn't. In the best of worlds, the prosecutor
abiding by her ethical commitment to "seek justice" would not
need this incentive. But one of the standard ways to address
w Id. at 934 n.75.
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agency problems is to structure systems that align personal goals
with broader institutional goals. And this might help do so.
Were our ethical prosecutor able somehow to lay out the
entire cooperation dynamic at trial, the effects on her incentives
might extend to discovery as well. One reason why prosecutors
fail to fully abide by their Brady and statutory discovery
obligations, 11 or limit the creation of discoverable material, is an
unfortunate zeal to win at any cost. 12 But another reason surely is
a belief that such materials are simply misleading, when taken out
of context. Were such context to be provided, this second concern
would be substantially diminished. Again, the point is not that the
cooperator's initial false statements to the government necessarily
have little evidentiary weight. Rather it is that a prosecutor
confident that they have little weight may still worry that the jury,
lacking knowledge of the full cooperation dynamic, will misuse the
statements.
Could we ever give a jury a complete picture of the
cooperation dynamic? Probably not, as the inherent limitations of
narrative presentation (and indeed even of videotaping) would
prevent any witness or series of witnesses from fully capturing it.
Prosecutors could, however, be encouraged to do a lot more in the
direction of such an exploration. What might be done? I'm not
quite sure. Courts already permit the government to introduce
prior consistent statements by cooperators, at least for purpose of
rehabilitation, even when those statements were made after the
cooperator's alleged motive to fabricate arose (i.e. after the
witness began cooperating)Y We could be even more receptive to
such proof. Just as the Federal Rules, recognizing the artificiality
of in-court identifications, explicitly invite evidence relating to the
circumstances of out-of-court identifications by testifying
witnesses/ 4 so might they, for the same reason, invite evidence
relating to cooperation dynamics. At the very least, courts could
be less dismissive of the probative value of such evidence, 15 and
less ready to label as cumulative the testimony of agents about
how a cooperator was handled.
11

See Panel Discussion: Criminal Discovery in Practice, 15 GA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 781

(1999).
12
13

See Gershman, supra note 1, at 848-49; Yaroshefsky, supra note 10, at 961-62.
See United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 25-29 (1st Cir. 2001) (explaining that

Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 801(d)(l)(B) does not preclude admission of prior
consistent statements that do not meet rule's requirements when they are offered to
rehabilitate credibility and not for their truth), cert. denied, 70 U.S.L.W. 3234 (U.S. 2001)
(mem); United States v. Ellis, 121 F.3d 908, 919-21(4th Cir. 1997) (same).
14 See FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(l)(C).
!5 See United States v. Forrester, 60 F.3d 52, 64-65 (2d Cir. 1995) (reversing conviction
in part because prior statement of government witness erroneously introduced).
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Would these and other similar measures encourage more
responsible behavior from prosecutors even in those cases that
never made it to trial? Quite possibly. There is an inevitable
artificiality to our entire trial process. Witnesses don't just take
the stand and produce nice narratives in response to non-leading
questions without considerable work that the uninitiated cannot
possibly appreciate. 16 But whatever limitations juries may haveand the work of Saul Kassin and others has made us painfully
aware of jurors' particular limitations when it comes to judging
credibility 11-it is surely true that more information about the
cooperator's odyssey from target to government witness would
improve jurors' credibility assessments in this area. As Gerry
Lefcourt 18 and others in this symposium have argued, more
probing cross-examination about this journey is needed, and
defense counsel should be given the tools to do it. We should,
however, consider more probing direct and redirect examination
as well. One need not accept claims of widespread prosecutorial
malfeasance or ineptitude to support efforts to expand the
evidentiary frame. Were prosecutors to perceive inquiry into the
cooperation process as an opportunity to improve their case, not
just defend it, we might do a better job in separating the more
professional from the less, and even increase the number of
professional ones.

16 See Bruce A. Green, "The Whole Truth?": How Rules of Evidence Make Lawyers
Deceitful, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 699 (1992).
17 See Saul M. Kassin, The American Jury: Handicapped in the Pursuit of Justice, 51
OH/PST. L.J. 687 (1990).
See Remarks of Gerald B. Lefcourt, at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
Symposium, The Cooperating Witness Conundrum· Is Justice Obtainable? (Nov. 30, 2000)
(on file with author).

